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This thesis investigates social, environmental, and econ-
omical factors that influence the enlistees* decision to
reenlist or leave the U.S. Navy. Results are presented both
at the aggregate level, and for each of the largest ratings
separately.
A model for computation of the U.S. Navy's savings by
retaining their personnel, along with a sensitivity analysis
of some of the involved variables, are also included.
The main conclusions of the study are:
a) Retention controlling policies should be decided upon
in accord with separate studies of each rating.
b) It is suggested that pay differentiation and different
promotion patterns be established for enlistees with different
background and different civilian work opportunities, to make
the U.S. Navy more competitive (and to reduce rent for some
personnel categories)
.
c) Objective information to the enlistees about civilian
earning opportunities may improve retention.
d) It should be considered to eliminate the contract
system after the first four years of service.
e) It should be considered to use a higher proportion
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The enlisted manpower of the U.S. military forces has
been scrutinized throughout the last decade. The research has
covered most thinkable aspects, among others:
a. the representatives of the All-Volunteer Force
b. the impact of women in the military
c. factors that have an impact on the recruitment of
enlistees
d. factors that have an impact on retention
The considerable research has been based on surveys of
enlistees who have entered the military with different atti-
tudes and different motivation as follows:
a. drafted personnel during the Selective Service System
through 19 7 2
b. draft-motivated enlistees through 19 72
c. true volunteers during the draft and later
Contrary to earlier surveys, the 19 7 8 DoD Survey of
Officers and Enlisted Personnel, which this research has been
based upon, covers to a large extent personnel who necessar-
ily must be classified as "true volunteers", since the seven
youngest year groups entered the military after the end of
the draft (the survey was carried out during the spring of
19 79). As to attitude and motivation for military service,
these year groups may be reckoned as more homogeneous than
earlier groups.

within the forces, there have been significant changes
in many of the factors that have been recognized as having
an impact on recruitment and retention, among these:
a. a higher proportion of women have entered the civ-
ilian and military work force, with a simultaneous
demand on the married men to share in the housework and
upbringing of children
b. the general educational level has been increasing,
and with a higher rate within the black than white race
c. earlier civilian income differences due to discrim-
ination of blacks have almost entirely disappeared among
those with high school or higher education
d. unemployment rates have increased seriously, and job
security has therefore become constantly more important.
One of the main manpower problems in the military today,
is to retain the personnel after their first enlistment per-
iod. Much time and money have been invested in the personnel
(recruitment, training, personal equipment, pay and benefits)
,
while their performance often is first reaching a satisfactory
level in the last part of the period.
The retention rate for first-term enlistees has been
especially low during the late seventies— around 35%—but
also among those who end their second term, the retention rate
of 68% is reckoned as too low [Ref. 1].
These low retention rates, especially among first- termers
,
is the problem which will be investigated in this study.
B. THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The purpose of this study is to present some of the
factors that seem to be of significant importance for
10

enlisted retention in U.S. Navy according to the most recent
military attitudinal survey.
Emphasis will be given to factors that to some extent
can be controlled by the Navy.
As it is assumed that the retention rates may differ sig-
nificantly among the various Navy ratings (due to different
career patterns, work environments, and civilian job opportun-





A. CONDUCT OF THE STUDY
The 19 78 DoD Survey of Enlisted Personnel is one of a
series of interrelated data collection efforts of the Rand-
DoD Survey Group. One of the objectives of this group is to
provide and examine policy-sensitive information about the
military life cycle. This survey focuses on the in-service
population, the men and women on active duty in all four
Services.
The survey is the only one administered to personnel in
all Services from which valid statistical inferences can be
drawn concerning the entire military population. It has pre-
viously been conducted in 1971, 1973 and 1976. Modification
and improvements in questionnaires and samples over the years
have made it difficult to use the survey material to measure
various changes in attitudes and characteristics. However,
the present survey contains rich information for major research
issues, such as retirement, pay, promotion, military environ-
ments, social problems, readiness, and retention. It is
emphasized that the sample is cross-sectional. Therefore,
the data is not from the same people surveyed repeatedly over
a number of years, but from people who serve in different
enlistment periods at a certain time.
12

Four different questionnaires were used - two for enlisted
personnel and two for officers, generally covering the follow-
ing topics:
a. Form 1 (Enlisted Personnel): Economic issues, civi-
lian employment, different reenlistment options, and
retirement.
b. Form 2 (Enlisted Personnel) : Rotation experience,
promotion, and utilization of women.
c. Form 3 (Officers) : A variant of Form 1, adopted for
officers.
d. Form 4 (Officers): A variant of Form 2, adopted for
officers.
This study used data from Form 1 exclusively.
The sample design of the survey was based on expected
response rates and the need for a statistically significant
number of usable responses in each cell of the stratification.
Within each Service, the basic stratification variable
for enlisted personnel was years of service (YOS) , and within
the two first YOS groupings (0-4 and 5-8) , there was a further
stratification by time remaining in enlistment contract
(time to ETS) . Finally, supplemental samples of enlisted
women and blacks were selected to allow for special analyses.
The nine cells resulting from this stratification are shown
in Table I [ref . 2]
.
B. THE SAI^PLE
This thesis, investigating factors that influence enlisted




SAMPLE STRATIFICATION FOR ENLISTED PERSONNEL
Sample Years of Time remaining
Cell No. Service (YOS) in contract (ETS)
1 to 4 <_ 1
2 to 4 > 1
3 5 to 8 < 1
4 5 to 8 > 1
5 9 to 12








respondents in the 1978 DoD Survey of Enlisted Personnel
(Form 1) .
For initial, general studies, the entire sample was
utilized. For further, more detailed analyses, the respon-
dents were included either if they were in the last year of
their first, second, or third enlistment teinn, or if they
had an extension to their enlistment period. The reason why
only those who were close to the end of their enlistment term
were included in the detailed analyses, will become evident
under the discussion of the retention criterion.
Contrary to the common method of gathering all non-whites
into a group in order to be able to use a variable to con-
trol for race differences, this study includes only blacks
and whites. This is based on the assumption that fundamental
differences may exist between the various minorities as to
attitudes, education, socio-economic background, ability to
accept the military way of life, etc. To mix the minorities
together into one group may therefore distort the findings.
Instead, similar studies should probably be carried out for
the other ethnic groups.
C. THE ANALYSIS
1. Electronic Data Processing
All electronic data processing was carried out on
the Naval Postgraduate School's IBM computer. The Statistical
15

Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) was used in all auto-
mated, statistical analyses [ref . 3]
.
2. The Retention Criterion
Two major problems had to be solved in order to use
the survey data for retention analyses:
a. The accuracy of "retention intention," as a predic-
tor for later, actual behavior, and
b. How to measure "retention intention."
Since the survey was not of the longitudinal type,
and did not follow up the respondents' current reenlistment
intentions with comparisons of actual reenlistment behavior,
it was necessary to take steps to ensure that the sample had
a highest possible correlation between intention and later
behavior.
According to Aizen and Fishbein- [Ref. 4] , an individ-
ual's intention is generally the immediate and most accurate
determinant of behavior, but certain conditions exist:
a. There must be correspondence between measure of in-
tention and measure of behavior as to the target (i.e.
the job), the action (i.e. reenlist or leave), the time
(i.e. at the end of the current enlistment term), and
the context (i.e. the military).
b. Intentions change over time. The longer the time
interval, the less accurate is the prediction of behavior
from intention. In other words, the closer to the deci-
sion point, the more accurate is the intention as a
predictor of behavior.
c. Aggregate intentions are much more stable than indi-
vidual intentions over time, because incidents that hit
individuals— like injuries, illness, pregnancy, money
losses, etc.— are likely to balance out at the aggregate
level. Predictions of behavior from intentions at the
aggregate level are therefore often remarkably accurate.
16

Also Chow and Polich [Ref. 5], found a close match
between the intentions to reenlist and actual reenlistment in
their recent study of first term retention in the Anny, Navy
and Air Force. That particular study was based on a survey
of 4,000 first term enlistees in 1976 who all had less than
one year left of their contract period. The enlistees' ex-
pressed intentions were compared with their actual behavior
one year later.
The other problem was that the survey did not contain
a question which asked the sample directly whether they in-
tended to reenlist or not under the current conditions, though
they were asked several questions about their likeliness to
reenlist under different reenlistment options. A dummy vari-
able to show the respondent's reenlistment intention had
therefore to be derived from the answers to the following
questions:
a. When you finally leave the military, how many total
years of service do you expect to have?
b. To the nearest year and month, how long have you
been on active duty? (If you had a break in service,
count current time and time in previous tours.).
The information from the last question was stored in
the data file in months, while question a, above, was stored
in years. The latter was multiplied by 12, to make the
answers comparable.
Those who had stated a difference of less than 48




were assumed to intend to leave, while the others were assumed
to intend to reenlist. The retention intention dummy variable
was given the value "1" for those who intended to reenlist.
These will hereafter be called "stayers", and the others
will be called "leavers".
In order to measure the quality of the created dummy
variable as an indication of retention intention, it was
tested in crosstabulations against four different survey
questions, which all were assumed to contain different answers
from those who intended to stay and from those who intended
to leave. Only those who were in their 4th year of service
or had an extension to their first enlistment period were
included in the test, since only those groups will be included
in the detailed study, as explained later.
The four questions were as follows:
a. What do you think your chances are of being promoted
to the next higher pay grade?
b. Think for minute about other military personnel who
have the same total years of service that you have. Which
of the following statements best describes when you
expect your next promotion?
c. How soon do you expect your next promotion?
d. Mark the three most important reasons why you would
leave the service. (The alternative answer which was
included in this test, was: "Does not apply, have not
considered leaving the service").
For the three three questions above, the respondents
were asked to mark a point on a Likert scale, or mark one of
the following optional answers:
18

a. Does not apply, I plan to retire
b. Does not apply, I plan to leave the service soon
c. Does not apply, I do not expect any more promotions.
Question d. above was a dummy variable, which would contain
the value "1" if that particular, optional answer had been
marked.
The results of the crosstabulations are shown in
Tables IIA to IID. As can be seen from Tables IIA to IID,
significant differences exist between the "stayers" and
"leavers"
:
a. Between 35% and 55% of the "leavers" have answered
that they will leave soon, while only around 1% of the
"stayers" have given that answer (Table IIA, IIB, IIC)
.
b. Between 8% and 9% of the "leavers" did not expect any
more promotions, while only .7% of the "stayers" had the
same, pessimistic opinion (Table IIB and IIC)
.
c. .9% of the "leavers" expected a promotion later than
4 years from the date that they were surveyed (this indi-
cates a minor error in the retention variable) , while
10.1% of the "stayers" expected their next promotion to
be so far out in time (Table IIC)
.
d. .4% of the "leavers" have answered that they have
not considered leaving the service, (which indicates
another, minor error in the retention variable) , while
21.9% of the "stayers" have never considered leaving.
The contradictions that have emerged by testing the
derived retention variable against four, different questions
as described above, show that around one percent of the
sample has inconsistent answers. Since it is not to be
expected that all the respondents in such a survey have clear,
consistent opinions about all the questions, some inconsisten-
cies among a respondent's answers are to be expected. (As
19

TABLE IIA to IID
A. TEST OF THE RETENTION INTENTION VARIABLE
Retention Intention
Chances for pay grade promotion Leave Stay
No Chance - Fair possibility
Fairly good possibility - Certain
Does not apply, I plan to retire






B. TEST OF THE RETENTION INTENTION VARIABLE
Retention Intention
Next Promotions, caipared with others Leave Stay
Earlier than most people 19.3% 38.8%
Same as most people 23.1% 45.0%
Later than most people 13.2% 15.5%
Do not expect any more promotions 8.0% 0.7%
Plan to leave 35.9% 0.1%
Plan to retire 0.6% 0.0%
20

C. TEST OF THE RETENTION INTENTION VARIABLE
Retention Intention
How soon do you expect
your next promotion? Leave Stay
In less than 4 years from now 48.7% 88.7%
More than 4 years from now 0.9% 10.1%
Does not apply, I
promotion
do not expect 9.0% 0.7%
Does not apply, I
service soon
plan to leave 40.5% 0.1%
Does not apply, I plan to retire 0.8% 0.0%
D. TEST OF THE RETENTION INTENTION VARIABLE
Retention Intention
Dummy Variable: I have not
considered leaving the Service Leave Stay
Marked (1) (i.e. The respondent
has not considered leaving the 0.4% 21.9%
service)
Unmarked (0) (i.e. The respondent




an example, the number of respondents who answered "Does not
apply, I plan to leave the service soon", varied between 874
and 947)
.
Nothing has therefore been done to eliminate the
minor error in the retention variable, and it is assumed to
have no systematic effect on the results of the study.
In order to conform to the conditions given by Aizen
and Fischbein when using intention as a surrogate for behavior
(see page 16 ) , only the last year group in each enlistment
period plus those who had obtained an extension to their en-
listment period, were used in the detailed studies. These
groups were all quite close to the point in time when a
decision would have to be made, and a high correlation is
therefore probable between intention and behavior. Chow and
Polich (see page 17) also based their study on enlistees with
less than one year left of their contracts.
By selecting the sample as described above, and using
the retention variable as a predictor only at the aggregate
level, Aizen and Fishbein's conditions (page 16) should all
be satisfied in this study.
3. General Analysis
The factors that will be included in this retention
analysis in order to measure their effect on the decision to
reenlist, are primarily those factors that are subject to
policy control by the DoD, such as military compensation and
benefits, promotion opportunities, and job environment.
Also the characteristics of the respondents and their
22

environment will be included, if they seem likely to have an
effect on the reenlistment decision.
The general analyses which will be carried out, will
be based on the following sample:
a. Except for the first analysis, which describes the
retention intentions for each of the 12 first years in
service, the sample consists of the last year group in
the three first enlistment periods (i.e. 4th, 8th, and
12th year)
,
plus those who are serving in an extension
of one of the three first enlistment periods.
b. The sample consists of only blacks and whites.
The analyses are as follows:
a. A description of how the intentions to reenlist varies
over the 12 first service years, based on current condi-
tions. Retention intentions between blacks and whites,
educational levels, and whether the respondents serve
within their ordinary contract period or have an exten-
sion will be discussed. These analyses are carried out
to get an understanding of how the retention intention
changes over the years--also within each enlistment
period— and to see the impact of the mentioned factors.
b. A further description will be made of how intention
to reenlist varies over the three first enlistment periods,
with sex as the controlling variable. Since it is a gen-
eral belief that women— especially those in the youngest
age groups—stay for a shorter period than men in their
jobs because they get married and/or become pregnant, it
is assumed to be of interest for the military policy
makers to know to what extent that belief is in accord-
ance with reality.
c. A description will be made of how intention to re-
enlist varies over the three first enlistment periods
between those who serve onboard ships and those who
serve ashore. This analysis may indicate that enlistees
find sea duty more attractive in some periods of their
military career than in others.
d. An analysis will be made of the importance of various
bonus alternatives on the intention to reenlist. Separ-
ate analyses will be carried out for different educational
levels. It is assumed that the bonus offers have a
stronger impact on lower educated personnel than on those
23

with higher education, due to the latter group's higher,
civilian earning opportunities.
e. A measure will be made of the consequences on reten-
tion if the probability to be promoted was to be reduced
by 50%. A reduced chance for promotion will both affect
short term and long term income, retirement benefits, and
status, and will probably affect younger personnel more
than those who are closer to retirement. In order to
measure the respondents' feelings about it, their inten-
tion to reenlist without a bonus and with a reduced pro-
motion probability will be compared.
f. The enlisted personnel were asked to mark the three
most important reasons why they would leave the service.
They were given 16 different alternatives to choose among,
covering financial reasons, job factors, social aspects
and other reasons. The frequency with which each of the
reasons was given will probably indicate their general
importance for retention. Such an analysis will be car-
ried out to discriminate between leavers and stayers,
and between people in different enlistment periods. The
most frequently mentioned reasons will be studied in more
detail in order to find the effects of education, race,
sea duty, family status, and sex.
4. Analysis of Differences Among the Various Ratings
Initially, it was intended to include the last year
group of each of the first three enlistment periods in the
detailed study, primarily in order to achieve a satisfactory
number of respondents in each rating. However, it turned
out early in the study that attitudes about various topics,
housing conditions and reasons for staying or leaving varied
significantly between people in different enlistment periods.
To combine younger and older groups of enlistees in the same
study would, therefore, only confuse the results and make the
results less usable for personnel management purposes.
The detailed study of variations among the ratings
is therefore based on the last year group of first- term
24

enlistees plus first-term extenders only. This group is also
most important to control because:
a. First termers are the most numerous group, and have
the lowest retention rate, according to earlier studies
and the general part of this particular study.
b. If the military does not succeed in making a first
tenner reenlist, it may never get the chance again. In
other words, before somebody can reenlist from the second
or third enlistment period, he or she must have reenlisted
after his/her first term.
At least in the short run, personnel policy makers
are therefore assumed to be most interested in learning about
those factors that need changes in order to improve the reten-
tion rate of first termers.
The enlistees are given different ratings - and there-
fore different work - based partly on their education, mental
category, and interests, and partly on the Navy's needs.
The abilities, conditions, and opportunities for
personnel in different ratings are assumed to vary significantly,
as follows:
a. People in some ratings are probably more needed at
sea duty than for service ashore.
b. For some ratings military specialist training is
provided. This, together with their original education
and abilities, may make the actual personnel especially
attractive for certain civilian jobs, and may result in
good civilian job offers and low Navy retention. On the
other side, since factors as educational level, personal
characteristics and abilities probably have a smaller
impact on total military earnings than they would have
on civilian earnings, it may be that the military pays
more than necessary (i.e. "rent") to recruit and retain
people in certain categories.
25

c. People in some ratings probably earn more money than
others, due to allowances for special services (sea pay,
jump pay, etc.) and pro pay.
d. The work environment may vary as to supervisors, peers,
job variation, challenges etc. for people with different
ratings.
e. The living conditions for people with different rat-
ings and their families may vary, as to civilian/military
housing, spouse's ability to get work etc.
If the assumptions above turn out to be correct, it
should be of interest to the military personnel policy makers
to be aware of the differences, so that appropriate actions
can be taken to control retention from the different ratings.
As previously mentioned, in the detailed analysis
the purpose will be to study differences that exist in atti-
tudes, retention rates, conditions, and opportunities among
personnel in different ratings, and thereby try to explain
variations in retention.
The following aspects will be covered:
a. Working and living conditions:
- proportions of personnel on sea duty
- work hours, and hours on call/duty
- reasons given for leaving
- income and allowances
b. Civilian opportunities:
- comparisons of military and civilian work
conditions
- expectations about civilian income opportunities
- financial "loss" by staying in the military
26

c. Retention elasticities: How does the retention
intention change under various reenlistment alternatives:
- a $4000 reenlistment offer
- an $8000 reenlistment offer
The detailed study will conclude with a section with
comments on each of the 16 ratings which have the largest
sample sizes in the survey. The purpose is to emphasize
those factors that seem to have the most impact on the reten-




A. CHANGES IN REENLISTMENT INTENTION OVER THE YEARS OF SERVICE
1. Results
Based on the retention criterion described earlier,
an SPSS "Breakdown" procedure was used to compute aggregate re-
tention intention and to determine whether it varies with years of
service. The sample was divided in separate groups, depending
on:
a. educational level
b. race (i.e. blacks and whites), and
c. whether they were serving in their ordinary enlist-
ment period or were serving during an extension.
The distribution of educational level within the total
sample is presented in Table III. The table shows that the
percentage of respondents with less than a high school diploma
is only 13.2, or 723 respondents. When these respondents are
divided into groups based on years of service, the groups are
generally becoming too small for statistical analyses.
For blacks in their ordinary enlistment period, re-
sults were obtained for people with High School diploma or
college education (people who have marked in the survey that
they have one or more college years of credit, are called
"college" in this study) up to and including the 8th year of
service. The number of blacks in the survey with either








Primary school only .
3
.1 .2
High school years without diploma 6.0 3.6 4.1
GED 6 . 8 9.4 8.9
High school with diploma 52.9 53.3 53.2
College credit 34.0 33.5 33.6
N = 5502 100.0 100.0 100.0
29

reliable statistical results. The results are shown in
Figure la.
For whites, results were achieved up to and including
the 12th year of service, but not longer. And, also among
whites, the number of respondents with less than a high
school diploma was too low for reliable statistical analyses
to be performed. The results are given in Figure lb.
The analysis of retention rates among those with an
extension to their original contract, gave statistically sig-
nificant results for personnel with a high school or college
education, serving in one of the first three enlistment
periods, as shown in Figure 2.
The general retention pattern was, as shown in figure
la and lb, that the retention rate reached its lowest point
in the 4th year of service (i.e. the last year of the first
enlistment period) . Only between 10 and 15 percent of the
respondents in that particular year group expressed the in-
tention to reenlist.
Among those who have reenlisted for the first time
within the last year, the attitude toward reenlistment was
much more positive, and, as it can be seen, around 40% of
those in their fifth year of service intended to reenlist
again. Since these people already have taken the decision
once, and belong to the minority which decided to stay, one
would expect a high retention intention rate - perhaps even





































Figure 1 Intentions to Reenlist, Based on Current
Reenlistment Conditions (The Sample consists





















Figure 2. Intentions to Reenlist, Based on Current
Reenlistment Conditions (The Sample con-





The retention rate then dropped again, from 40% in
the fifth year to reach a new low in the seventh year, but
increased to around 45% in the last year of the second en-
listment period.
Again, the pattern showed a steep increase in reen-
listment intention (for whites only) in the 9th year, among
those who have just reenlisted for the second time, and the
rate stayed beyond 75% during the whole third period,
with a slightly upward trend.
The retention patterns for both races and for those
with high school diplomas or college education tracked each
other most of the time. The biggest differences were:
a. Black people with college education had a very low
retention intention rate all through the first enlist-
ment period. For the seventh and eighth year, they
also had a lower intention to reenlist (15%) than any
other group.
b. White enlistees with high school had a lower reten-
tion rate than whites with college in the first year
of the second enlistment period, while the situation
was opposite in the first year of the third enlistment
period.
c. Within the white sample, the college group had a
slightly higher intention to reenlist than those with
high school throughout the first eight years, but from
the 9th year, the situation was reversed.
Among those who served in an extension of their con-
tract, the retention intention rates were quite similar to
those of the year groups 4, 8, and 12 (Comparison of Figure
3 with Figures 1 and 2). The exceptions were:
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a. Black first term "extenders" had a retention inten-
tention rate of around 2 5%, compared with around 12.5%
for blacks in their fourth year.
b. Black second- term extenders with college education
seemed to be more likely to reenlist than the similar
group with eight years of service.
Among the extenders, those with college background
had generally a higher intention to reenlist than did enlist-
ees with only a high school background.
2. Conclusion
The lowest retention rates were found among first-
term extenders and among first termers in their last contract
year. The detailed study later will concentrate on these
people.
In the further general analyses, the sample will con-
sist of the last year group in each of the three first con-
tract periods and extenders. The other year groups will be
excluded from consideration because of the relatively long
time span to a reenlistment decision, as described earlier
(page 16 ) .
Since the retention intention patterns of blacks and
whites were similar and of the same magnitude— especially
among those in the last year of each contract period— the
further general analyses will not discern between the two
races. Neither will the detailed study of rating groups.




B. RETENTION INTENTION DIFFERENCES BETWEEN WOMEN AND MEN
1. The Sample
Figure 3a shows how the retention intentions varied
between women and men.
In order to control for different retention intention
rates between different educational levels and between those
who had sea duty or served ashore, the sample consisted of
only enlistees with high school or higher education, and
they all served ashore. Choosing respondents who served
ashore only, was done both because of the low number of women
who served onboard ships, and because they were not eligible
for all enlisted jobs onboard. Retention intention rates
obtained among women and men on sea duty would therefore
hardly be comparable.
For women, the number of respondents in their third
enlistment period was too low to warrant analyses.
2. Results
Contrary to what many would have expected, the reten-
tion intention rate for women was as high - or even higher
for extenders - as men's among first termers.
In the second enlistment period, the retention inten-
tion rate for men was the double of women's, except for
extenders where women and mqn had almost identical retention
intention rates.
Women who had an extension to their ordinary enlist-











(Ord.) (Ext.) (Ord.) (Ext.) ( Ord . ) (Ext.)








(Ord.) (Ext.) (Ord.) (Ext.) (Ord.) (Ext.)
b. Men Serving at Sea or Serving Ashore.
Figure 3. Intentions to Reenlist, Based on Current
Reenlistment Conditions. The Sample,
which is Segregated by Sex and by Sea or
Shore Duty, consisted of Personnel with
HS-Diploma or College background only.
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in their ordinary period. This was not the case among men
for whom extended service seemed to have no influence on
retention intention.
3. Conclusions
It seems to take women two enlistment periods before
family considerations, dissatisfaction with the Navy, or other
factors make their retention intention rates lower than those
of men. In the detailed study of ratings presented later in
this thesis, sex differences will be ignored.
The reasons for the relatively high retention rates
among female extenders have not been investigated in this
study. Various factors, like their marital status, job loca-
tion close to the family, and special job assignments may
explain some of the differences.
C. RETENTION INTENTION DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ENLISTEES SERVING
ASHORE AND AT SEA DUTY
1. The Sample
Figure 3b shows how the retention intentions varied
between enlistees serving ashore and at sea duty.
In order to control to some extent for different
retention intention rates among different educational levels,
the sample consisted of enlistees with high school diploma or
higher education only. Siace the number of women serving
onboard ships was small, and since they only served in special
jobs and onboard in special ships, women were not included




Among those in their first enlistment period, the re-
tention intention rate was only around 6% for people on sea duty
compared with around 20% for people serving ashore.
The relative differences were much smaller in the
second enlistment period, where the retention rates were
around 41% and around 53%, respectively.
In the third period, the situation was reversed:
Those serving onboard ships had the highest retention inten-
tion rates.
VThile the retention intention rates were almost of
the same magnitude between those in their ordinary contract
and extenders during the two first periods, this was not the
case in the third period, where the extenders' retention in-
tention rates were significantly lower.
3. Conclusions
The analysis may indicate that it is especially hard
for the youngest enlistees to serve onboard ships. This may
be due to factors like:
a. low income, and need for "moonlighting"
b. a higher desire and need to be at home with spouse
and children
c. a desire to use spare time on further education.
The reasons for the differences have not been analyzed parti-
cularly in this study, but are partly covered in the later
analysis of the respondents' reasons for leaving. Such a
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study could indicate that sea duty should be covered to a
larger extent by more senior enlistees in order to improve
the overall retention rate. It is therefore assumed to be
worthwhile to have a study made to investigate if retention
rates would improve if age, income level, marital status, and
a personal desire for more education were taken into account
when people are ordered to serve onboard ships or ashore.
Also the reasons for the lower retention intention
rates among third-term extenders (which is the case both in
the previous analysis (Figure 3a) and here) should be closer
investigated. One reason for the lower retention intention
rates may be that some of the third- term extenders already
have achieved 20 years of service and intend to retire shortly.
D. THE IMPACT OF TWO BONUS ALTERNATIVES ON RETENTION INTENTION
1. The Sample
The enlistees were asked to indicate their likeliness
to reenlist if they received:
a. no reenlistment bonus
b. $4000 in reenlistment bonus
c. $8000 in reenlistment bonus
For each of the three bonus alternatives, they indicated their
likeliness on a Likert scale with the values described below,
d ( in 10) No chance
1 ( 1 in 10) Very slight possibility
2 ( 2 in 10) Slight possibility
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3 ( 3 in 10) Some possibility
4 ( 4 in 10) Fair possibility
5 ( 5 in 10) Fairly good possibility
6 ( 6 in 10) Good possibility
7 ( 7 in 10) Probable
8 ( 8 in 10) Very probable
9 ( 9 in 10) Almost sure
10 (10 in 10) Certain
To measure the impact of the two different bonus
offers, the reactions from those questions were compared
with the reaction to the "no bonus" alternative.
Since it can hardly be expected that the bonus alter-
natives will have a significant, negative effect on retention
among those who intend to reenlist under current conditions
(according to the earlier explained retention criterion)
,
the sample in this analysis consisted of only those who in-
tended to leave under current conditions.
Those individuals who had not finished high school
were excluded from the analysis.
The results are shown in Figures 4a and 4b, for
people with a high school diploma and college, respectively.
The figures show only the average changes in likeli-
hood, and do not provide information about how many change
from a negative to a positive retention intention.
Another analysis was therefore carried out, to



















































b. Personnel With College Education
Figure 4. The Importance of Bonus on Likeliness to
Reenlist. The Sample consisted of those




this analysis, bot±i "leavers" and "stayers" (according to the
earlier described retention criterion) were included.
First, it was necessary to redefine the respondents
as "stayers" or "leavers" based on their answers on the sliding
scale. A "Fair possibility" sounds positive, and somebody
would probably set the dividing line between "Some possibility"
and "Fair possibility". On the other hand, "Fair possibility"
has been assigned the probability "4 in 10", or 40% only.
The dividing line was therefore set between "Fair possibility"
and "Fairly good possibility".
Then it was investigated what percentage of the sample
changed from being a "leaver" —according to the "no bonus"
alternative — to a "stayer" when they were offered $4000 or
$8000 in reenlistment bonus. The results are shown in Table
IV. The first column in Table IV presents the total number
of personnel in each subgroups in U.S. Navy, according to
weights that have been assigned to the respective respondents
in the data file from the survey. The weights were provided
by the Defense Manpower Data Center.
2. The Results
According to Figure 4a and Figure 4b, the bonus offers
did influence the likeliness to reenlist. However, for one
group only —those with high school diplomas in their third
enlistment period —did the bonus of $8000 make the likeliness












% Change in intention to reenlist







46,759 HS 1 +9.1 19.3 + 19.3 29.5
9,090 II Ix* + 13.8 22.8 + 23.4 32.4
8,977 II 2 + 17.1 62.1 +28.2 73.2
8,098 II 2x* + 14.4 63.4 + 22.5 71.5
2,434 II 3 4.0 94.0 +9.8 99.8
19,727 College 1 + 12.2 27.2 + 26.6 41.6
5,313 II Ix* + 7.8 23.8 +19.1 35.1
6,257 II 2 + 12.5 60.5 +20.8 68.8
7,371 II 2x* + 14.2 66.2 + 25.7 77.7
2,381 II 3 + 11.3 86.0 + 10.1 84.8
* X indicates extended period
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From Table IV, it can be seen that the bonus offers
increased the number of stayers between 4 and 28%, depending
on years of service and education. For several groups, the
$8000 bonus offer increased the number of stayers with more
than twice the effect of the $4000 bonus offer.
In general, the bonus offers had the lowest impact
on reenlistment among those in the end of their third period,
and the $8000 bonus offer had a less positive effect than the
$4000 bonus on this group's college subclass' retention in-
tention. The low effect is probably due to the fact that
this group's enlistment rate is already high under current
conditions. The group may also be negative toward having a
high bonus established for everybody while their own career
is approaching an end ("we managed without the bonus during
our first years").
The analysis will be continued in the next chapter.
E. THE ECONOMICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE TWO BONUS ALTERNATIVES
1. The Method
In order to measure the total savings per person
from various bonus offers, the following information must be
available (per person)
.
RC - Recruitment costs (variable)
TC - Training Costs




W^ - Pay, allowances and costs of benefits
during the second- term
P^ - Average, first term productivity
V^ - Average, second term productivity
BC - The costs of the bonus offer
The savings (S) per retained first termers would then be:
RC + TC + W^ W- + BC
S = ± f
^ P2
The total savings of retaining first termers would be
n
S111TS = Y' .N.D.i.—
i=l
where S is the savings per person, in one particular category
(ref. formula above),
N is the number of personnel in a category,
D is the (positive) percentage change in reenlistment,
i a group (based on educational level and contract
period)
.
The formula for S above can be made more accurate by
a. making present value considerations, and by
b. taking retirement costs into account.
For b, above, the probability that the person who
reenlists will stay until he/she is eligible for retirement
benefits must also be considered. The general formula for
computing the savings by retaining a person from
A productivity of "1" should be the standard which one
tries to achieve. Therefore, if a person's performance is
estimated to be 40% of the goal, the productivity rate is .4.
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RC[l+i]'^ + (1+i)^ +1 1
S =
^1




where: S = Savings per person
RC = Recruitment costs (which are assumed to incur
before the new recruit enters service)
.
TC = Training costs
AW- = Annual wages, allowances and value of benefits
during the first term
P., = Average productivity during the first-
term
AW. = Annual wages, allowances and value of benefits
' during the jth enlistment period (j = 2 to 5)
BC = Value of bonus offer assumed paid in full
four years after reenlistment
P. = Average productivity during jth term (j =
^ 2 to 5)
RW = Annual retirement pay (50% of salary in the
20th year of service)
PR = Probability that a person in the jth enlist-
ment period stays in the military til he/
she is eligible for retirement pay
m = number of years that recruitment costs are
paid in advance before the recruit starts
his/her service (assumed to be one lump sum)
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n = number of years from the recruit
starts the service, until training
costs are paid (assumed to be one lump
sum)
r = number of years that retirement pay will
be paid, if the person stays till he/she
is eligible for retirement pay
i = interest rate
j = enlistment term
q = no. of years till retirement (16, 12, 8 or
4 for 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th enlistment
period respectively)
The present value formulas which are implemented in
the formula above, are described by Dowlin, Martin, and Scott
[Ref. 6].
In order to use the formula for computation of savings
per person and total savings, the data in Table V were cre-
ated. The data is partly computed, and partly assumed, as
follows:
a. Annual wages and allowances (AW.) are based on the
survey data, but rounded. ^
b. Average productivity (Pj) is assumed, but partly based
on Gay and Albrecht's consideration [Ref. 7).
c. Retention rates are computed from the survey data,
and are the weighted sums of retention intention rates in Figures
1,2,3, and in Table IV.
d. The probability that the person will stay in the
military till he/she is eligible for pension (PR) is
the product of the future retention rates.
e. The number of years to retirement (q) is computed
as the difference between 20 years of service and
current YOS.
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g. Time for payment of recruitment costs (m) and train-
ing costs (n) as well as recruitment costs (RC) and
training costs (TC) are assumed.
h. Number of years that retirement pay will be paid
(r) , has been set to 38 years, or equal to an average
life expectancy of around 76 years. This is in accord
with the life expectancy data from the Bureau of Census
(Ref. 13].
i. Retirement pay (RW) has been set to 50% of annual pay
in the 5th enlistment period.
2. The Results
The following results do not claim any kind of gener-
ality, especially because of the rather randomly set product-
ivity rates. As it will be shown later, variations in the
productivity rates will have a strong influence on the
savings.
The purpose of this chapter is primarily to:
a. present the cost savings model and a method for com-
putation of the financial consequences from different
bonus alternatives and from their corresponding changes
in reenlistment rates, and
b. make a sensitivity analysis of the involved variables.
The results of the computations, along with the
results of the sensitivity analysis which will be described
below, are given in Tables VIA to VID.
The total annual savings for the U.S. Navy, based
on the data in Table IV and V and the previously described
equation for total savings (TS) , are presented in Table VIII.
The sensitivity analysis was carried out to measure
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Savings based on data on 16,543 Base 13,718 Base
Table V
10% increase in first- 8,300 -50 5,475 -60
term productivity
10% increase in second- 21,018 +27 18,451 +35
term productivity
10% increase in interest 19,927 +20 17,221 +26
rate
10% increase in retirement 14,053 -15 11,228 -18
pay
10% increase in training 17,488 +6 14,664 +7
costs

















Savings based on data in (1,957) Base (4,781) Base
Table V
10% increase in first- (10,200) -421 (13,024) -172
term productivity
10% increase in second- 2,901 +248 334 +106
term productivity
10% increase in interest 2,405 +223 (300) +94
rate
10% increase in retirement (5,875) -200 (8,700) -82
pay
10% increase in training (1,012) +48 (3,836) +20
costs





PRODUCTIVITY RATES AND INTEREST RATES THAT BALANCE
THE COSTS OF RECRUITING AND RETAINING PERSONNEL
a. Assuming that all other values in Table V are fixed, the
following first-term productivity rates will result in













First-termers .79 .72 .80 .74
2nd- termers .65 .62 .67 .65
3rd- termers .48 .47 .48 .47
4th- termers .39 .38 .39 .38
b. Assuming that all other values in Table V are fixed, the
following interest rates will result in a cost balance












First-termers 3.5% 4.0% 3.0% 3.5%
2nd- termers 6.0% 6.5% 5.5% 5.5%
3rd- termers 8.5% 9.0% 8.5% 9.0%




THE TOTAL U.S. NAVY SAVINGS BY ESTABLISHING A $4000 OR












HS 1st- termers , ord. service
HS 1st- termers, extended
service
HS 2nd- termers, ord. service
HS 2nd- termers, extended
service
HS 3rd- termers, ord. service








College, 3rd- termers, ord.
service
46,759 $187 mill. $358 mill.
9,090 $ 55 mill. $ 84 mill.
8,977 $ 54 mill. $ 81 mill.
8,098 $ 41 mill. $ 58 mill.
2,434 $ 2 mill. $ 3 mill.
19,727 $108 mill. $216 mill.
5,313 $ 19 mill. $ 42 mill,
6,257 $ 29 mill. $ 45 mill,
7,371 $ 38 mill. $ 65 mill.
2,381 $ 4 mill. $ 3 mill.
$539 mill. $955 mill.
The savings are based on the previously made
assumptions in this chapter.
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would have on the cost savings. The results are included
in Table VIA to VID (both the new, saved amount, and the
percentage change from the base) . Only one variable was
changed in each computation. All other variables contained
the base values, as listed in Table V.
In conjunction with the sensitivity analysis, the
first-term productivity rate and interest rate which would
balance the costs of recruiting new and retaining "old" en-
listees, were computed. This was done by entering different
first-^term productivity rates and interest rates into the
equation, until the savings (S) were zero. These rates are
presented in Tables VIIA and VIIB.
3. Conclusions
The savings per retained person and total savings, as
presented in Table VIA to VID and VIII, should not be used as
true savings, as explained above. However, the numbers do
give an indication about the magnitude of the sums that are
involved, and makes it quite obvious that such analyses
should be carried out. The sensitivity analysis also under-
lines the importance of accuracy for some of the variables.
The following, general conclusions can be drawn:
a. The savings per retained individual are highest for
first-termers while each reenlisted fourth-termer pro-
vides a loss, because of the retirement benefits for
which he will probably be eligible.
b. Bonuses should primarily be given to first-termers
and second-termers who reenlist, since the savings are
highest for those categories.
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c. The highest bonus gives the highest total savings,
because of the steep increase in the retention rate.
d. The most important determinants for the savings per
retained person are the productivity factors. A small
change in the first-term productivity rate makes big
changes in savings, primarily when first-termers are
compared with second- termers and third- termers.
e. If first- termers' average, relative productivity rate
is higher than around .75, it pays off to recruit new
personnel instead of retaining first- termers and second-
termers. On the other side, if first- termers ' average
productivity rate is lower than around . 40 , it is less
expensive to retain third- termers and fourth- termers
,
in spite of the high retirement pay for which these
persons will soon be eligible.
f. Changes in the interest rates are also important, and
make significant changes in the savings. If the interest
rate in the computations is higher than around 13%, it
is less expensive to retain third-termers and fourth-
termers, than recruiting new personnel.
g. Changes in the number of years that retirement pay
will be paid (due to changes in average life expectancy)
has almost no importance on the estimates. The reason
is that the present value of money that is due 38 or more
years into the future is very low, with current, realistic
interest rates.
h. The analysis emphasizes the importance of grouping
the personnel into "homogeneous" groups before such
analyses are carried out. In this particular analysis,
the grouping criterions were: enlistment term, ordinary
or extended service, and educational level. This thesis
will later discuss the importance of grouping the person-
nel into groups according to their ratings, hypothesizing
that retention rates and reactions to bonus offers differ
significantly between ratings within the same enlistment
term. Only when the personnel are grouped appropriately,
will the results of similar analyses make it possible to




F. THE CONSEQUENCES OF REDUCED PROMOTION OPPORTUNITIES
1. The Sample
The sample in the survey was asked about their like-
liness to reenlist if the probability to be promoted to the
next higher pay grade was reduced by 50%. The respondents
marked their answers on a sliding scale identical to the one
used with the bonus questions.
Two different methods were used to measure the
consequences:
a. The average likeliness to reenlist with reduced pro-
motion probability was compared with the likeliness to
reenlist if no bonus would be paid. In this analysis,
the sample consisted of only those who would stay under
current conditions, since those who have decided to leave
under current conditions will probably not be encouraged
to stay if the promotion probabilities are reduced. The
sample was divided into groups, based on enlistment
period and educational level. The results are presented
in Figures 5a and 5b.
b. Since the previous method only shows the average
change in likeliness to reenlist, another analysis was
carried out to measure how many change from a positive
to a negative reenlistment intention. In this analysis,
both stayers and leavers —according to the retention
intention criterion —were included. As in the analy-
sis of the bonus alternatives, the respondents were
redefined as "stayers" or "leavers" according to their
answer on the sliding scale. The analysis measured the
percentage of the sample that changed from a positive
reenlistment intention if no bonus was offered to a
negative reenlistment intention if the promotion prob-
ability is reduced. The results are presented in
Table IX.
2. Results
According to Figures 5a and 5b, a reduced promotion
probability will be received much more negatively among the


































(Ord.) (Ext.) (Ord.) (Ext.) (Ord.)
First-Termers Second-Termers Third-Termers
b. Personnel With College Education
Figure 5. The Consequences of a Reduced Promotion
Probability. The sample consisted of those





THE IMPACT OF A REDUCED PROMOTION PROBABILITY
ON RETENTION INTENTION
End of Change in New
Enlistment Reenlistment Reenlistment
Education Period Intention Rate Intention Rate
HS 1 -5.7 4.5
HS IX* -5.1 3.9
HS 2 -12.2 33.0
HS 2X* -19.4 29.6
HS 3 -14.9 76.1
College 1 -3.4 11.6
College IX* -4.1 11.9
College 2 -24.9 24.1
College 2X* -25.9 26.1
College 3 -29.7 47.3
* X indicates extended period.
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third- termers keep the average likeliness to reenlist beyond a
"Fairly good possibility". Table IX shows that a reduced pro-
motion probability has the highest impact on likeliness to
reenlist among the college group (in percent) , and that the
relative change increase with tenure. However, in numbers of
individuals, a 5.7% change for first termers has a higher
impact on drop in reenlistment than the third- termers 14.9%.
The last column of Table IX, which shows the new reenlistment
intention rates, shows that only around 4% of the first- term
high school group would reenlist, and around 11% of those
graduates with college background.
3. Conclusions
The new, extremely low retention rates among first-
termers would have a severe impact on manpower stocks. Within
a few years, almost all enlistees would be first- termers . The
following example, based on Bartholomew and Forbes [Ref. 8]
shows the impact of two different permanent retention rates
on the manpower distribution 16 years later (Table X) . The
low retention rates in alternative A would almost "wipe out"
experienced and high-productive enlistees, and would probably
have severe consequences for the performance of military units,
A reduced promotion probability would influence the
enlistees' annual income, future retirement pay, and their
perception of status in the society. The financial conse-
quences alone would probably be much more severe for the




THE IMPACT OF TWO DIFFERENT RETENTION RATES
ON MANPOWER DISTRIBUTION 16 YEARS LATER
Enlistment
Period









1st- termers 10% 81.3% 40% 52.1%
2nd- termers 50% 8.0% 50% 20.8%
3rd- termers 80% 4.1% 80% 10.4%
4th- termers 100% 3.3% 100% 8.3%
5th- termers - 3.3% - 8.3%
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The financial consequences for the military of a re-
duced promotion probability can be analyzed with equations
analogous to those which were used in conjunction with the
bonus alternatives. Such an analysis has not been included
in this thesis.
As it will be described later, low income was the most
frequent reason given by enlistees who leave the military.
The present data therefore strongly indicates that a reduction
of the current or future income level for enlistees is not an
adequate option for the military.
G. THE MOST IMPORTANT REASONS FOR LEAVING THE MILITARY
1. The Sample
The surveyed personnel were asked to mark the three
most important reasons for leaving the military. They could
choose between 16 alternative reasons plus the optional "I
have not considered leaving" and "I plan to retire at the end
of my current term" . The alternative answers cover financial
reasons, social reasons, and extrinsic and intrinsic job
factors.
The sample was grouped into year groups. As in the
previous analyses, only the last year group in each enlistment
period was studied. The sample was also divided into groups
based on the intention to leave or stay to make it possible
to compare and find out whether the groups gave different
priorities to the various reasons.
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The results are presented in Table XI.
2. The Results
The table shows that the most frequent reasons to
leave were (in order according to the number of responses)
:
a. Low pay/allowances
b. Better civilian job opportunities
c. Dislike being separated from my family
d. Reduction in military benefits
e. Plan to continue my education/use GI/VEAP-benefits
f. Disagree with personnel policy
g. Decline in quality of military personnel
h. Discrimination against military personnel based on
race, sex, or rank
i. Dislike location of my assignments
j . Not enough opportunity for advancement
Other findings from Table XI:
a. "Disagree with personnel policy" was given relatively
more frequently among leavers than stayers.
b. "Discrimination" was a relatively more frequent reason
among the younger than the older enlistees.
3. Comparison of Military and Civilian Income Levels
2\mong the foremost reasons to leave, three of them
had to do with income. While some psychological theories —
like Herzberg's Two Factor Theory (Ref. 9] —does not rank
pay among the important factors for job satisfaction and
tenure, there may be special circumstances that make this




FREQUENCY OF SELECTION OF REASONS
FOR LEAVING THE MILITARY^
Reason to Leave Leavers Stayers
4^ 8 12 16 4 8 12 16
Have not considered
leaving
5 2 5 16 45 34 18
Plan to retire after
this term
11 2 4 10
Not eligible to reenlist 13 2 1 4 1
Dislike location of my
assignment
85 22 1 11 20 5 3
Frequency of PCS moves 25 16 2 2 9 1 2
Dislike separation from
family
29 5 132 8 2 37 54 26 11
Family wants me to
leave
68 17 2 4 1 1
Disagree with personnel
policy
288 48 4 2 13 9 2 1
Discrimination (sex,
race, rank)
99 20 1 13 13 2 1
Lack of opportunity for
advancement
59 31 1 15 24 10 3
Low pay/allowances 474 139 6 3 53 67 22 18
Better civilian job
opportunities
397 114 8 2 34 44 13 8
Reduction in military
benefits
226 116 8 5 58 79 34 18
Decline in quality of
military personnel
185 66 7 3 20 36 13 9
Unable to practice job
skills
63 14 2 3 10 2 3
Bored with job 70 10 2 6 1
Don't like my job 59 15 6 7 1 1
Will continue education 386 56 3 1 21 21 3 3
Data in table are number of responses. Each person could




A comparison has been made of military and civilian
income levels based on data from 19 78. The military sample
consists of those with 4 years of service only, and they are
compared with civilians aged 18-to-24 years old. The military
income information is all contained in the survey. The civ-
ilians' earnings, which are collected from Current Population
Reports [Ref . 10 and 11] , are average earnings for employed
Americans from all ethnic groups in the United States.
The formula for computation of Regular Military Com-
pensation (RMC) takes the military tax advantage into account,
and is in accordance with Chow and Polich's equation [Ref. 5].
Military earnings were calculated as follows:
a. Regular Military Compensation (RMC)
:
(Basic pay + (Tax savings factor x
(Basic Allowance for Quarters +
Basic Allowance for Subsistence) ) )
.
b. Special Allowances:
Jump pay. Sea pay, Submarine pay, Flight pay,
and Pro pay.
c. Total, Military Income:
RI4C + Special Allowances
d. Household Income:
Total military income + off duty work +
spouse's earnings + social welfare payments.
These military individual and household incomes were
compared with similar civilian incomes segregated by years




COMPARISON OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN EARNINGS (19 78)
a. Military income and household income for first- termers
Unmarried,
No dependents Married
Average, total military income $8,721 $11,326
Average, military household income $9,20 6 $14,209
b. Comparison of military and civilian incomes
Elementary HS- 1-3 Yrs.
Completed Diploma College
Average civilian income $8,299 $10,503 $11,322
(18-24 yrs. old) (Base)
Military pay higher (lower), $ 492 ($ 1,782) ($ 2,601)
unmarried
Military pay higher (lower), $3,097 $ 823 $ 4
married
c. Comparison of military and civilian household incomes,
segregated by educational level of head of household.
Elementary HS- 1-3 Yrs.
Completed Diploma College
Average, civilian household $11,425 $17,648 $19,407
income (Base)
Military pay higher (lower), ($ 2,219) ($ 8,442) ($10,201)
unmarried




the total military income for unmarried personnel is higher
than the average pay for civilians with elementary school,
but lower than the average pay for civilians with HS diploma
or some years of college education.
For married, military personnel, the total military
income was higher than civilian income at all educational
levels. The pay difference was highest for those with lowest
education.
Comparisons of household income showed that military
household income in average was much lower than for civilian
families, except for the group where the head of the household
had only elementary school education.
4. A Deeper Analysis of the Most Frequent Reasons to Leave
The reasons for which leaving the military were most
frequently given, were analyzed in more detail. The following
analyses were carried out:
a. The percentage of the persons at each educational level
who had responded to the reasons "Low pay and allowances"
and "Better civilian job opportunities" was calculated.
It was hypothesized that these reasons were most frequently
given by personnel at a higher educational level. For
results, see Tables XIIIA and B.
b. The extent to which race and current, educational
level influenced enlistees to leave to continue educa-
tion is shown in Table XIIIC.
c. The extent to which the reason "Dislike being separ-
ated from family" was given among those with sea duty
compared to those with service ashore and among enlistees
with or without dependents is shown in Table XIIID.
d. Whether those who "Disagree with personnel policy"
were mainly at sea duty, belonged to a large extent to
one of the races, or to one of the sexes is shown in
Tables XIIIE and F.
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TABLE XIIIA to XIIIF
RELATIVE FREQUENCY OF ENDORSEMENT OF THE MOST
FREQUENT REASONS FOR LEAVING THE MILITARY BY
EDUCATION, RACE, SEX, AND SEA/SHORE DUTY























Black No Diploma Stat. Insign *• .1569
GED .3395 Stat. Insign.*
HS .3933 .1474
College .4982 .1450








Sea Duty Sea Duty














Sea Duty Sea Duty





37.1% 21.5% 1.5% 5.7%
27.8% 34.0% 8.8% 10.7%





















According to the data in Table XIIIA, low pay and
allowances in the military was most frequently a reason to
leave for the first- termers. Despite what could be expected,
the first-termers with the lowest education gave this reason
more frequently than those with higher education. This is in
contradiction both with the previous income analysis (Table
XII) and with the response rates in Table XIIIB about civilian
job opportunities.
However, the important question is not whether the
personnel's civilian earnings expectations are realistic or
not, but what they perceive that they can earn, because it is
their subjective expectations that make them decide whether
to stay or leave. The military solution may therefore not
necessarily have to be to pay all groups better, but to provide
objective information about civilian earning opportunities.
Such information could probably reduce attrition, especially
among low-educated, married personnel.
Also better civilian job opportunities were more fre-
quently given as a reason to leave by first- termers than by
personnel with more tenure (Table XIIIB) . In general, the
higher the respondent's education, the higher was the proportion
of the personnel that felt civilian job opportunities were
a strong reason for leaving.
Also a high proportion of first- termers thought of
leaving because they wanted to continue their education, and
some wanted to use their G-I bill or V.E.A.P. benefits.
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Generally, a much higher proportion of blacks than whites at
each educational level gave this reason for considering leaving
(Table XIIIC) ,
To be separated from the family was mentioned as a
reason for leaving much more frequently among those at sea
duty than among those ashore, which sounds reasonable. Even
among those with service ashore, this reason was given by
around 40% of enlistees with wife and/or children, which in-
dicates that enlistees frequently are —or expect to be —
living separated from their family (Table XIIID) . Also a
surprisingly large proportion of enlistees without wives or
children (i.e. singles) mentioned separation from family as
a problem. This indicates that singles also have a need to
be together with their family (parents, sisters and brothers,
friends, etc.), a factor that has not been given much con-
sideration.
To disagree with personnel policy can mean many dif-
ferent things, and no further precision of what the answer
was supposed to include was given in the survey questionnaire.
It can, among other things, include special treatment of dif-
ferent races, special treatment of females, disagreement with
pay-policy, career patterns, lack of work autonomy, etc.
According to Tables XHIE and F, this answer was much more
frequently given among first- termers than among those with
longer tenure, more often among whites than blacks, and gen-
erally more often among those at sea than among those ashore.
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Among first- tenners , this reason was much more frequently
given by white males than by white females.
5. Conclusions
Based on the data in Table XII, it seems that the
military was paying high rent (i.e., overpayed) enlistees
with low education, especially when they were married. Con-
sidering the current military problems with recruiting enough
personnel with higher education, it seems as a wage differ-
entiation could make military wages more in accordance with
civilian wages, and solve some of the manpower problems with-
out increasing total expenditures.
From Table XI it can also be seen that a relatively
high proportion of enlistees with higher tenure had not con-
sidered leaving. The same personnel seemed — according to
Tables XIIIA to XIIIC — less oriented toward higher pay and
education. Whether they stay in the military because of a
high degree of job satisfaction (challenging work, job autonomy,
responsibility, or job security) , whether it is because of
lack of other opportunities due to low school grades or a
low mental category, or because of the future retirement
benefits, is not analyzed in this thesis.
A further discussion of the various reasons for leav-





IV. EXISTING DIFFERENCES BE'T/JEEN PERSONNEL
IN DIFFERENT RATINGS
A. THE SAMPLE
As previously described (page 26), this part of the thesis
will deal with the differences that exist among the different
ratings in work environment, income, and civilian opportuni-
ties, and thereby try to explain some of the reasons for dif-
ferent retention rates. The purpose is mainly to make it
evident that proper retention control can only be achieved
if the military both understands that different ratings may
have different reasons for leaving and reacts accordingly with
different vehicles (bonuses, educational incentives, sea/shore
duty times, etc.) for different ratings.
The sample consists of those in their last year of the
first- term plus first- term extenders only.
The respondents were asked in the survey to give their
current, primary rating. Four "boxes" were made available
for the rating in the questionnaire, while the codes have a
total length of 2 to 4 letters and numbers. Because it was
possible to write a rating code in different ways, the data
file did not contain a unique representation of each rating
code. For example, the code "AD" was contained in the data
file in the following ways:
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"AD " "ADl " "ADOl" "ADIO" "AD 1"
" AD " "AD2 " "AD02" "AD20" "AD 2"
" AD" "AD3 " "AD03"
" A D"
It was therefore necessary to do more than 600 data mod-
ifications in the data file before data processing and analyses
of the various ratings could begin.
The following results will not necessarily be statistic-
ally significant at the .05 level. The reason is mainly that
the number of persons in each rating is rather low - from 8 to
86 enlistees. Ratings with a sample size lower than 8 have
been excluded from this analysis. Exceptions are the ratings
CTT and CTO with 5 and 6 respondents, respectively. These
two ratings will always be "grouped" with the somewhat bigger
ratings CTA and CTR in the discussion.
If CTA, CTO, CTR and CTT are regarded as one rating (i.e.
CT) , Table XIV gives the distribution of sample sizes in the
study.
Table XV gives the abbreviated rating name and the full
rating title for the ratings included in this study. In the
remainder of the text of this thesis, the abbreviated form
will be used.
B. RETENTION INTENTION RATES FOR VARIOUS RATINGS
1. The Results
Based on the previously described retention dummy




THE DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE SIZES IN THE STUDY










RATINGS INCLUDED IN THE STUDY
ABH Aviation Boatwain's Mate
AC Air Controlman
AD Aviation Machinist's Mate
ADJ " " " (Jet Engine)
AE Aviation Electrician's Mate
AK Aviation Storekeeper
AMH Aviation Structural Mechanic (Hydraulics)
AMS " " " (Structures)
AO Aviation Ordnanceman
AQ Aviation Fire Control Technician
AT Aviation Electronics Technician
AZ Aviation Maintenance Adm. man
BM Boatwain's Mate
BT Boiler Technician
CTA Communication Technician (Adm)
CTO " " (Comm)
CTR " " (Collection)
CTT " " (Tech)
DP Data Processing Technician




EW Electronics Warfare Technician
FTG Fire Control Technician (Gun)
FTM " " " (Surface Missile)
GMG Gunman's Mate (Gun)
HM Hospital Corpsman
HT Hull Maintenance Technician
IC Interior Communications Technician
MM Machinist's Mate
MR Machinery Repairman







STG Sonar Technician (Surface)




Table XVI presents the retention rates, a 9 5% confidence inter-
val and the sample size for each rating. The confidence
intervals are computed according to the formula
" = ^ ± \025 /.f'l-P'
n
described by Wonnacott and Wonnacott [Ref . 12] , where
IT = population proportion
P = sample proportion
t
-.25 = the critical t-value for a 9 5%
confidence interval, with n-1
degrees of freedom
n = sample size
This formula can only be used for sample sizes equal to, or
larger than 25. For the ratings with smaller sample sizes,
the Clopper-Pearson Chart was used [Ref. 12].
Formulas exist for derivation of confidence intervals
between two population proportions, and thereby make it pos-
sible to determine with confidence whether two proportions
are different or not. This requires, however, larger sample
sizes than what is available in this study. In other words,
due to the small sample sizes, it has not been determined
whether the various retention rates in Table XVI really are
different from one another.
However, several of the ratings —with sample sizes
up to 20 —have a retention rate of zero, which means that
nobody in the sample intended to reenlist. The rating YN has




RETENTION INTENTION RATES FOR THE RATINGS IN THE STUDY
% % VJork
Conf'idence Assigned to Outside
Rating Mean Interval N A Ship Rating
Average 0.12 .11 - .14 1159 .60 3.3
ABH .33 .09 - .67 12 .83 2.7
AC .0 8 .25 3.6
AD .04 .0 - .25 21 .19 3.1
ADJ .12 8 .0 2.3
AE .21 .04 - .44 19 .21 3.4
AK .30 .08 - .63 13 .07 4.0
AMH .10 .0 - .46 10 .20 3.5
AMS .14 .0 - .38 21 .31 3.2
AO .05 .0 - .30 17 .46 4.2
AQ .11 9 .12 3.4
AT .20 .08 - .33 44 .23 3.5
AZ .08 .0 - .42 12 .16 3.7
EM .09 .0 - .19 41 .94 3.8
BT .12 .0 - .33 24 .90 3.9
CTA .54 .22 - .85 11 .0 3.1
CTO .20 5 .0 4.2
CTR .40 .12 - .75 10 .0 4.4
CTT .33 6 .0 4.3
DP .26 .07 — .52 15 .21 4.0
DS .0 .0 - .18 20 .68 2.7
EM .05 .0 — .12 52 .90 3.0
EN .0 .0 - .17 18 .76 3.1
ET .06 .0 - .12 80 .69 2.8
EW .0 .0 - .30 11 .00 2.3
FTG .10 .0 - .21 30 .96 2.8
FTM .06 .0 - .16 30 .96 2.3
CMC .0 .0 - .18 19 ,94 3.1
HM .03 .0 - .08 83 .11 3.2
HT .10 .0 — .21 30 .00 3.7
IC .03 .0 - .11 28 .96 3.2
MM .03 .0 - .07 86 .97 3.8
MR .0 8 .75 2.3
MS .28 .09 - .47 25 .68 3.5
OS .06 .0 - .15 33 .90 2.3
PN .25 .08 - .42 28 .29 3.8
QM .0 .0 - .32 10 .87 3.0
RM .13 .06 - .21 86 .57 3.2
SH .15 .03 - .37 19 .73 3.1
SK .10 .0 - .20 39 .50 2.9
STG .05 .0 - .30 18 .94 2.5
STS .10 .02 - .33 19 ,94 3.1
YN .35 .21 — .50 45 .20 3.4
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therefore strong indications of different retention rates be-
tween the various ratings. Thus, the retention rates will be
used accordingly in the rest of the study as indications.
Also the following findings per rating: the educa-
tional level, income data, and attitudes are constrained by
the small sample sizes, and will be used as indications only.
C. EDUCATIONAL LEVEL




HS - no diploma 27 2.4
GED 75 6.5
HS - diploma 723 63.1
College* 321 28.0
1,146 100.0
*College: 1 or more years in college
Some ratings turned out to have a specially high propor-
tion of enlistees from the two lowest, educational levels:
ABH (25%), AMH (40%), BT (21%),
while high proportions of personnel with some college educa-
tion were found in
AC (50%), DP (47%), HI4 (42%),
PN (43%), STS (50%), YN (49%).

No branches had personnel from only the lowest —or only the
highest —educational level. People with HS-diploma were used
in every rating. This indicates that:
a. No work area was perceived by the military authori-
ties to be so easy to perform that no formal education
is needed, or
b. Some of the people in some of ratings were over-
qualified.
Comparisons between average educational level in the
ratings and retention intention gave no clear correlations.
Some of the ratings with a high educational level had very
low retention intention rates, while others had high rates.
The same was found for ratings in which the educational level
was lower
.
This lack of correlation is probably partly due to
the fact that both high and low educated personnel leave be-
cause of perceived, higher civilian pay and opportunities,
and in order to improve their education. (See Tables XI, XII
and XIIIA to XIIIC.)
D. MILITARY WORK CONDITIONS AND CIVILIAN OPPORTUNITIES
1. Sea Duty
If sea duty is an important factor among the younger
enlistees for leaving the Navy, as indicated in Figure 3, one
would assume that retention rates were generally lowest within
those ratings with a high proportion of personnel at sea.
These proportions are given in Table XVI and show that within
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some ratings more than 80% of the personnel are at sea:
STS, STG, QM, OS, im, IC , HT, GMG,
FTM, FTG, EW, EM, BT , BM, and ABH.
On the other side, within the following ratings, less than
20% have sea duty:
HM, CT, AZ, AQ, AK, ADJ, and AD
The first group has retention rates between and 12%
which are generally lower than the last group's retention rates
The correlation between sea duty and retention intention is
presented in Table XXIV.
2 . Work Outside Rating
There seems also to be a correlation between reten-
tion and the extent to which one works within or outside the
rating. The respondents were asked to indicate how much of
their work was outside their rating. Their answers were given
on a sliding scale, as follows:
Most of None of
the time the time
Those ratings which — according to the results in Table XVI -
had average values lower than 2.6 had also very low retention
rates (between and 12%) , while those with values above
4.0 had retention rates between 5 and 54%. The correlation
between work outside rating and retention intention is pre-




. Comparisons of Civilian and Military Work Conditions
The enlistees were asked how they would think that
their current job would compare with a civilian job if they
left the service now and took a civilian job, in regard to
the following work conditions:
a. The immediate supervisors
b. Having a say in what happens to me
c. The retirement benefits
d. The medical benefits
e. The chance for interesting and challenging work
f. The wages and salaries
g. The chance for promotion
h. The opportunities for training
i. The people I work with
j. The work schedule and hours of work
k. The job security
1. The equipment I would use on the job
m. The location of the job
Their answers were given on a sliding scale with the following
values
:
Civilian Civilian About The Civilian Civilian
Job Would Job Would Same In A Job Would Job Would
Be a Lot Be Slightly Civilian And Be Slightly Be A Lot
Better Better Military Job Worse Worse




COMPARISONS OF CIVILIAN AND MILITARY WORK CONDITIONS^ '
^
The Data are average responses
2Continues on the next page
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Rating Super- Having Retire- Med- Challen- Wages Chance
vision a say tirements ical ging Work for pro-
Benefits motion
Average 2.00 1.61 2.51 2.97 1.73 1.32 1.90
ABH 1.81 1.81 2.90 3.60 2.18 1.27 2.27
AC 1.50 1.37 2.50 3.00 1.37 1.00 1.62
AD 1.95 1.52 2.33 2.61 1.85 1.23 1.85
ADJ 2.50 1.75 2.37 3.37 2.12 1.62 2.12
AE 2.38 1.77 3.16 3.55 1.61 1.38 1.94
AK 3.07 2.46 3.00 3.92 2.53 2.15 2.75
AMH 1.88 1.33 1.88 2.77 2.55 1.44 2.00
AMS 2.04 1.47 2.50 3.05 1.71 1.33 1.66
AO 2.11 1.70 3.00 3.33 2.29 1.47 2.29
AQ 2.77 2.33 2.55 3.00 2.11 1.11 1.55
AT 2.15 1.79 2.65 2.73 1.77 1.20 1.76
AZ 1.83 1.75 2.41 3.16 1.83 1.41 1.83
BM 1.71 1.73 2.52 3.05 1.70 1.36 1.87
BT 1.73 1.47 1.95 3.04 1.87 1.08 1.86
CTA 2.20 2.63 2.77 3.66 2.44 1.55 2.11
CTO 2.60 1.60 2.00 2.20 1.60 1.20 1.80
CTR 2.80 2.40 2.88 4.00 2.00 1.90 2.10
CTT 2.50 1.20 3.33 3.33 2.33 2.00 2.60
DP 2.46 2.20 2.66 2,73 2.20 1.28 1.93
DS 1.68 1.30 2.35 2.15 1.40 1.10 1.75
EM 1.96 1.47 2.30 2.78 1.61 1.19 1.78
EN 1.55 1.77 2.44 2.88 1.83 1.05 2.11
ET 2.03 1.48 2.38 2.87 1.53 1.16 1.85
EW 1.72 1.36 2.40 2.54 1.45 1.09 2.10
FTG 1.86 1.46 2.36 2.53 1.63 1.23 2.00
FTM 2.00 1.46 2.55 2.90 1.70 1.23 1.93
CMC 1.78 1.52 2.47 3.31 1.72 1.26 2.00
HM 2.17 1.60 2.87 3.42 1.90 1.56 1.98
HT 1.62 1.65 2.44 2.51 1.51 1.17 1.82
IC 1.67 1.32 2.07 2.60 1.42 1.07 1.51
MM 1.70 1.51 2.23 2.58 1.36 1.08 1.82
MR 1.87 1.50 1.87 2.50 1.25 1.25 1.25
MS 2.04 1.69 3.08 3.45 1.75 1.82 2.00
OS 2.00 1.31 2.59 2.90 1.70 1.21 2.00
PN 2.53 1.96 3.03 3.46 1.78 1.50 2.32
QM 1.50 1.40 2.10 2.70 1.50 1.10 1.40
RM 1.89 1.45 2.36 3.08 1.69 1.34 1.72
SH 1.52 1.57 2.66 3.31 1.55 1.26 1.84
SK 2.10 1.62 2.41 3.12 1.60 1.37 1.97
STG 1.83 1.50 2.05 2.72 1.44 1.11 1.66
STS 2.57 1.78 2.52 2.52 1.89 1.00 1.77
YN 2.24 1.73 2.68 3.13 1.95 1.73 2.06

TABLE XVII (con't)
COMPARISONS OF CIVILIAN AND MILITARY WORK CONDITIONS





Schedule Security ment tion
Average 2.14 2.15 1.61 3.15 1.86 1.52
ABH 2.36 2.09 1.72 3.18 1.83 1.18
AC 1.62 2.37 2.25 3.00 1.37 2.50
AD 2.25 2.33 1.33 3.33 1.52 1.85
ADJ 2.12 2.25 2.00 3.25 2.00 1.50
AE 2.22 2.27 1.50 3.38 1.88 1.61
AK 3.23 2.69 2.38 3.38 2.75 2.23
AMH 2.33 2.11 1.00 3.12 1.44 1.55
AMS 2.23 2.23 1.38 3.42 1.80 1.52
AO 2.35 1.81 1.94 3.20 2.29 1.47
AQ 2.22 2.44 1.87 3.55 1.77 1.55
AT 2.22 2.27 1.93 3.44 1.88 1.63
AZ 1.91 2.25 1.63 2.91 2.18 1.16
BM 2.02 1.83 1.73 2.69 1.70 1.39
BT 2.21 2.00 1.08 2.82 1.86 1.30
CTA 2.66 2.44 2.55 3.25 2.44 1.90
CTO 1.80 2.60 1.60 3.20 2.20 1.20
CTR 2.40 3.00 2.00 4.11 2,20 2.10
CTT 2.80 3.16 2.16 3.66 1.83 2.16
DP 2.13 2.86 1.86 3.20 1.66 1.80
DS 1.95 2.05 1.47 2.90 1.55 1.15
EM 2.11 2.28 1.21 3.05 1.90 1.38
EN 1.77 2.16 1.64 3.11 1.55 1.44
ET 2.15 2.26 1.45 3.25 1.80 1.40
EW 2.30 2.18 1.45 3.45 1.54 1.09
FTG 2.26 1.96 1.41 3.46 1.56 1.53
FTM 2.06 2.16 1.65 3.46 1.63 1.36
GMG 2.10 1.84 1.68 3.00 1.89 1.36
HM 2.22 2.39 2.12 3.31 1.98 1.67
HT 2.17 1.79 1.48 3.20 1.72 1.41
IC 1.60 1.67 1.42 3.07 1.53 1.32
r^ 1.87 1.97 1.15 2.88 1.55 1.27
MR 1.42 1.87 1.50 2.50 1.25 1.37
MS 2.65 2.21 1.95 3.30 2.21 1.69
OS 2.22 1.77 1.45 3.09 2.06 1.37
PN 2.30 2.35 2.14 3.28 2.00 1.96
QM 1.40 1.40 1.60 2.44 1.60 1.60 •
RM 2.04 2.02 1.29 2.87 1.89 1.44
SH 2.10 1.47 1.42 2.63 1.78 1.21
SK 2.08 2.24 1.75 3.35 2.13 1.75
STG 1.94 1.50 1.33 2.72 1.38 1.16
STS 2.55 2.52 1.36 3.33 1.88 1.89
YN 2.28 2.34 1.84 3.13 2.26 1.84
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The average scores for the total sample shows that
everything was expected to be better in a civilian job, ex-
cept for job security. The strongest improvements were
expected to be in the areas:
a. Wages (score 1.32)
b. Job Location (score 1.52)
c. Work schedule and work hours (score 1.61)
d. Having a say in what happens to me (score 1.61)
e. Challenging work (score 1.73)
f. Chance for promotion (score 1.90)
In Table XVIIIA are listed - for each work condition -
those ratings which expect the strongest improvements by
changing to a civilian job, and those ratings which expect
the smallest improvements or worse work conditions in a
civilian job.
In Table XVIIIB are listed those ratings which fre-
quently were included in the Table XVIIIA, together with their
retention rates from Table XVI. Those who expected strong
improvements had generally extremely low retention rates,
while those who were least optimistic about a civilian job
had generally retention rates far above the average.
When some of the ratings expect strong improvements
in their work conditions if they take a civilian job, it may




THE RATINGS THAT EXPECTED MOST AND LEAST
IMPROVEMENTS BY TAKING A CIVILIAN JOB











































TABLE XVI I IB
RATINGS FREQUENTLY INCLUDED IN TABLE XVIIIA
Expect Strong Improvements Expect Small Improvements
Rating Repetition Retention Rating Repetition Retention
AC 6 .0 AK 11 .3
IC 6 .03 CT 9 .4
MR 6 .0 PN 7 .25
STG 5 .05 MS 5 .28
AMH 4 .1 STS 4 .1
EN 3 .0 AO 4 .05
QM 3 .0 ABH 4 .33







a. The civilian, comparable jobs are really providing good
work conditions, compared to the Navy job and to other civil-
ian jobs. These are probably higher paid jobs, where a high
compensation for the manpower exists.
b. The current military job offers work conditions which
are worse than other military jobs. If that is the case,
the civilian alternative does not necessarily have to be
more attractive than most other civilian jobs, to make the
personnel leave the military.
People who come under category a, above, will probably
leave even if they feel quite satisfied with the military life,
because of a high pay difference. For these prople, more
competitive wages will probably be the most effective and
efficient way to improve retention. However, for those who
come under category b, above, the retention rates could prob-
ably be improved more effectively by providing a better, mil-
itary work environment. More will be said about this later,
in separate comments to some of the ratings.
4. The Most Important Reasons to Leave the Military
In the previous section, the most important reasons
for leaving the military were found for personnel in each
enlistment term.
In this section, the most important reasons for
the various ratings will be assigned.
Table XIX shows the percentages of each rating that
has marked that particular reason for leaving. In Table XX,
the ratings that mentioned the particular reason most fre-
quently are listed. The fact that the reason to leave varied




THE MOST IMPORTANT' REASONS TO LEAVE THE MILITARY"^
Rati ng Not eli- Location Frequen- Separa- Family Pers- Dis-
gible to of AssigiT:- cy of tion fran wants sonnel crim-
Reenlist ment PCS Moves family me out Policies ination
Average .01 .09 .03 .34 .06 .29 .10
ABH .08 .08 .0 .33 .08 .25 .08
AC .0 .0 .0 .25 .0 .25 .12
AD .04 .0 .0 .14 .0 .42 .09
ADJ .0 .12 .12 .62 .0 .12 .0
AE .0 .10 .0 .36 .05 .42 .10
AK .0 .15 .07 .38 .07 .15 .07
AMH .0 .30 .0 .40 .10 .30 .20
AMS .0 .04 .0 .42 .09 .19 .04
AO .0 .17 .0 .58 .17 .41 .23
AQ .0 .11 .0 .11 .11 .22 .0
AT .0 .04 .11 .37 .02 .23 .16
AZ .0 .36 .0 .18 .09 .27 .0
BM .04 .17 .02 .34 .0 .26 .24
BT .04 .08 .0 .56 .04 .34 .08
CTA .0 .18 .0 .18 .09 .09 .0
CTO .0 .0 .0 .40 .0 .20 .20
CTR .0 .0
.
.0 .10 .20 .10 .30
CTT .0 .0 .0 .0 .16 .16 .16
DP .0 .06 .0 .26 .06 .13 .06
DS .0 .05 .0 .30 .0 .35 .15
EM .0 .03 .01 .34 .0 .34 .05
EN .0 .16 .0 .38 .22 .11 .11
ET .01 .07 .06 .26 .03 .40 .05
EW .0 .18 .0 .45 .09 .27 .18
FTG .0 .06 .03 .44 .10 .31 .03
FTM .0 .03 .0 .43 .03 .23 .0
GMG .0 .15 .05 .31 .05 .31 .05
HM .01 .07 .04 .20 .09 .22 .09
HT .0 .13 .03 .48 .20 .27 .06
IC .0 .07 .0 .35 .0 .35 .10
MM .03 .08 .0 .39 .08 .29 .05
MR .0 .25 .0 .50 .12 .62 .0
MS .08 .16 .04 .20 .04 .32 .20
OS .03 .03 .03 .50 .03 .50 .06
PN .0 .10 .0 .17 .03 .28 .07
QM .0 .10 .0 .30 .10 .40 .10
RM .02 .05 .05 .34 .02 .36 .16
SH .0 .05 .0 .42 .05 .21 .21
SK .0 .02 .02 .34 .02 .26 .13
STG .0 .05 .0 .44 .0 .11 .0
STS .0 .10 .05 .57 .15 .21 .10
YN .0 .11 .04 .26 .13 .11 .15
"The table continues on the next page.
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TABLE XIX (con' t)
THE MOST IMPORTANT REASONS TO LEAVE THE MILITARY
Rating Not LCM Better Reel. Decline Cannot Bored Don't
enough pay S. civ. in mil- in qual. prac- with like
export. allow- opport. itary of pers. tice job job
for ac3v. ance benefits skills
Average .07 .50 .42 .28 .21 .05 .06 .07
ABH .0 .41 .50 .08 .33 .03 .0 .0
AC
.0 .75 .87 .0 .12 .0 .0 .0
AD .14 .80 .38 .28 .28 .0 .04 .0
ADJ
.0 .50 .75 .37 .0 .12 .0 .0
AE .05 .57 .42 .26 .21 .0 .0 .05
AK .0 .30 .15 .38 .07 .07 .0 .0
AMH
.0 .50 .30 .30 .30 .0 .0 .0
AMS .04 .47 .33 .76 .23 .14 .04 .0
AO
.0 .58 .23 .35 .05 .0 .0 .11
AQ .33 .77 .55 .22 .22 .0 .0 .0
AT
.09 .53 .51 .30 .20 .06 .02 .04
AZ .18 .63 .27 .45 .18 .0 .0 .0
BM
.0 .41 .29 .12 .24 .04 .09 .09
BT
.0 .56 .65 .21 .21 .04 .04 .08
CTA
.0 .63 .27 .54 .18 .09 .09 .0
CTO
.20 .40 .20 .80 .20 .0 .0 .0
CTR .20 .40 .50 .50 .0 .0 .20 .0
CTT
.16 .33 .16 .0 .16 .16 .0 .0
DP
.0 .66 .40 .26 .13 .06 .0 .06
DS .05 .55 .80 .20 .25 .05 .0 .0
EM .07 .63 .59 .28 .21 .0 .03 .01
EN .0 .55 .44 .27 .38 .11 .05 .0
ET .08 .52 .46 .23 .21 .05 .05 .12
EW
.0 .36 .45 .27 .09 .09 .09 .0
FTG
.0 .41 .55 .34 .20 .13 .13 .10
FTM
.0 .46 .60 ,26 .26 .06 .06 .16
GMG
.0 .52 .15 .42 .21 .05 .05 .0
HM .12 .37 .26 .30 .19 .09 .04 .04
HT .03 .55 .51 .24 .13 .06 .10 .03
IC .03 .39 .57 .28 .25 .03 .03 .03
MM .04 .53 .54 .18 .19 .04 .03 .19
MR
.0 .12 .50 .12 .12 .12 .12 .12
MS .04 .32 .32 .32 .16 .16 .04 .04
OS .03 .53 .09 .15 .21 .03 .03 .13
PN .03 .53 .35 .32 .28 .0 .03 .03
QM
.0 .40 .60 .0 .30 .20 .20 .10
RM .08 .47 .35 .23 .11 .02 .10 .09
SH .15 .36 .36 .21 .31 .05 .0 .0
SK .10 .47 .15 .47 .31 .02 .07 .05
STG .11 .61 .55 .33 .27 .11 .05 .11
STS
.0 .52 .68 .15 .10 .0 .0 .0




THE RATINGS THAT MOST FREQUENTLY MENTIONED





Dislike location of my assign-
ment
AMH , AO , AZ , BM , EW , MR
Better civilian job opportunities AC,ADJ,BT,DS,EM,lr"iM
Dislike being separated from
family
ADJ,AO,BT,MR,OS,STS




Discrimination against military AO,BM,MS,SH
Not enough opportunity for
advancement
AQ,AZ,CT,SH
Low pay and allowances AC , AD , AQ , AZ , DP , EM , STG
Reduction in military benefits AMS,BM,CT,GMG,SK
Decline in quality of military
personnel
ABH,EN,SH,SK
Don't like my job ET,FTM,MM,OS
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need for different retention controlling policies for the
various ratings.
Comparisons between Table XVIII and XX show that, in
general, the ratings that have expressed low wages most fre-
quently as a reason to leave, were not the same ratings that
expected the strongest wage improvements by taking a civilian
job. This shows that it is not necessarily the size of the
pay difference that make the personnel leave, but probably
whether their current pay level is perceived to be fair, and
makes it possible to cover their most common needs or not.
The correlation between retention intention and the factors
"Separation from family" and "Personnel policies" was analyzed
The results are presented in Table XXIV.
5. Comparisons of Military Income and Expected Civilian
Income
Earlier in this thesis, military compensation and
allowances were compared with national, average income levels
for people with different levels of education. The findings
indicated that the military paid rent to the lowest educated
personnel, and paid too little to unmarried personnel with
higher amounts of education.
This analysis will examine to what extent total mili-
tary income and expectations about civilian earnings vary
between the ratings.
The total military income is computed as described
earlier. The sample in the survey was asked how much they
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would expect to earn per year in wages and salary if they left
the military and took a full-time job.
Table XXI presents the military, total income figures
and expected civilian earnings per rating. In a separate col-
umn, the special allowances are presented. Those amounts are
included in the total income figures.
The column for total military income includes both
married and unmarried personnel. Since marital status has a
significant impact on the military income, it is here assumed
that the distribution of married and unmarried personnel is
the same in all ratings. Since the number of people in each
rating to some extent is small, this assumption is probably
not in accordance with reality. However, to make separate
analyses for married and single personnel would reduce the
number of people in many of the ratings to an unsatisfactory
level.
However, variations in special allowances (described
on page 6 6) should be of more interest than the total mili-
tary pay, since the allowances are the main reasons for pay
differentiations, except for marital status. The annual allow-
ances vary significantly, from zero to more than $3,000* Since
the numbers are averages, there are probably big differences
also within each rating, but the numbers still indicate that
the total income is quite dependent on the person's rating.
Expectations concerning civilian pay varied from




TOTAL MILITARY INCOME AND EXPECTED CIVILIAN EARNINGS
Rating Special Total Expected Difference
Allowances Military Civ. Earn- Mil. /Civ.
in $ Income in $ ings in $ Inc. in $
Average 993 9830 14710 4880
ABH 100 6780 15720 8939
AC 1400 10976 17457 6480
AD 213 10055 14875 4819
ADJ 160 8800 15500 6699
AE 16 9726 13566 3840
AK 51 8742 8822 80
AMH 170 9280 13466 4186
AMS 1155 11494 15233 3739
AO 201 8830 11900 3069
AQ 200 11573 16500 4926
AT 139 9969 15235 5266
AZ 20 9127 14000 4872
BM 178 8167 12902 4735
BT 2060 10536 14521 3985
CTA 9362 13927 4564
CTO 39 10082 11125 1042
CTR 5887 10666 4779
CTT 3600 14690 13666 -1023
DP 795 10386 17708 7321
DS 1148 9976 16305 6328
EM 1414 10284 15097 4813
EN 2611 11404 18133 6729
ET 1136 9859 16734 6874
EW 919 9225 16136 6910
FTG 1343 10082 14857 4774
FTM 1115 9346 15339 5993
GMG 633 8089 12428 4339
HM 177 9286 14164 4878
HT 2086 10871 14762 3890
IC 1278 9206 15621 6415
MM 2184 10565 16400 5834
MR 1524 8569 13093 4524
MS 1640 9964 12213 2249
OS 1026 8964 12472 3508
PN 943 10592 13518 2926
QM 342 8977 15166 6188
RM 887 9320 13957 4636
SH 828 8621 13538 4916
SK 279 8976 11471 2495
STG 186 8767 16230 7463
STS 2352 12411 17166 4755
YN 752 10209 13025 2815
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expected t±ieir annual salaries to increase by almost $5,000,
or 49.6 percent, if they took a civilian job. The ratings
that expected the highest civilian salaries were:
AC, AQ, DP, DS, EN, ET, EW, MM, STG and STS
,
while those who have the highest allowances (and therefore earn
most during the first term) were:
AC, AG, BT, EM, EN, FTG , HT, MM, MS and STS.
Only the ratings AC, EN, MM and STS were in both groups above.
The correlation between retention intention and the
amount of special allowances and expected civilian earnings
was analyzed. The results are presented in Table XXIV.
Compared with the figures in Table XII the respondents'
civilian pay expectations are generally much higher than aver-
age national income levels. Some studies indicate that military
service has a positive impact on people's pay, but since the
All Volunteer Force contains higher proportions of lower men-
tal groups than the total population, [see Cooper, Ref. 14],
there is no reason to believe that their average earnings will
be above the average, national level. Their civilian pay ex-
pectations are, therefore, probably to a large extent unrealis-
tic. However, it is the expectations that play a role in their
decision to stay or not. Therefore, it is possible that re-
tention could be improved if personnel were provided realistic
information about what they could earn outside the military.
In other words, a pay hike is not necessarily the only way to
reduce pay dissatisfaction. (See also page 72 ) .
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Earlier in this study, it has been suggested to use
pay differentiation to avoid paying rent, and to make military
pay more in accordance with the market wage. Such a pay scale
should probably take into consideration that relevant civilian
pay differs for the various ratings.
Without any documentation from the survey, this writer
believes that the reenlistment bonus is not perceived as a pay,
but as a compensation for signing up for four more years. If
that is true, reenlistment bonuses may not be the appropriate
way to use money to control retention. If the bonus was
spread out to increase monthly pay in the desired ratings, this
may turn out to be more effective. If the reenlistment bonus
disappears, it means that the four-year reenlistment contract
system will also have to stop. While the first four-year con-
tract is explained by heavy military training investments in
the personnel, there should be no similar reason to require
the personnel to commit themselves for so long a time if they
reenlist. The current reenlistment system is probably per-
ceived by many first- termers as very rigid and inflexible
compared with civilian opportunities, and may scare unnecess-
arily many away. It is therefore suggested that further study
of the reenlistment system be carried out with emphasis on
the consequences of the following proposed changes:
a. V7hen the first- term contract was over, enlistees would
enter a nearly ordinary employer-employee job relationship,




b. The reenlistment bonus system would be cancelled, and
the money instead used to add to the monthly pay primarily
for people in ratings that leave because of high civilian
wage opportunities.
6. The Likeliness to Find a Good Civilian Job
As important for retention as work conditions, chal-
lenges, pay and opportunity to be with family, is probably
the likeliness for the enlistees to find a good civilian job.
Some enlistees have received highly specialized military
training, which there is little or no demand for among civil-
ian companies. This group will therefore probably be more
inclined to reenlist than people who are trained in areas that
are highly demanded outside the military.
The unemployment rates in the civilian industries will
also influence retention, exactly as the rates influence re-
cruitment. High unemployment in one branch will therefore
tend to increase retention in those ratings where that parti-
cular industry usually recruits its manpower.
The survey asked about the enlistees' likeliness to
find a good civilian job if they tried. The respondents
marked their answer on a sliding scale, which is described
along with the results in Table XXII.
The results show that all the considered ratings had
a generally optimistic view on their likeliness to find a
good civilian job. The most optimistic personnel were in
the ratings;





THE LIKELINESS TO FIND A GOOD CIVILIAN JOB
Scale
12 2 4 5 6 1 8 9 10
No Chance Fairly Good Certain
Possibility














































while the least optimistic personnel were in:
At4H(.l), AO(.05), BM(.09), CT(.4), MS(.28), SH(.15),
and SK(. 1) .
The retention rates from Table XVI are given in paranthesis
after each of the ratings above, and show that the most op-
timistic personnel — as to likeliness to find a good civilian
job — tend to have lower retention rates. The correlation
between the retention intention and likeliness to find a good,
civilian job was analyzed. The results are presented in
Table XXIV.
7. The Impact of Two Bonus Alternatives on Retention
As previously described, the respondents were asked
about their likeliness to reenlist if they received a $4,000
or $8,000 reenlistment bonus.
Using the same method as earlier in this thesis, the
retention rate with each of the bonus alternatives was com-
pared with the no-bonus alternative.
The results of the analysis, which was carried out
for each rating, are presented in Table XXIII.
For some of the ratings, the bonus alternatives seem
to have little or no effect. For them, the desire to leave
the military is obviously very strong. This is the case for:
AQ, DS, EM, FTG, FTM, HT, MM, OS, QM and STS,














































































































































Ratings with originally low retention intentions who
respond strongly to the bonus alternatives, are:
AC, AD, AO, AZ, BM, EN, EW, GMG , HM, IC.
The analysis also indicates that the following ratings,
with original retention intention rates between .2 and .4,
will increase the retention rates to between . 4 and . 8 if the
highest bonus alternative was established:
ABH, AK, AT, CT, DP, MS, PN, and YN.
If productivity rates were available for each rating, it would
probably be advantageous to carry out separate economical
analyses for each rating, in accordance with the previously
described sensitivity analysis.
By using the equation on page 4 6, it should be pos-
sible to determine the economical consequences of retaining
the first- termer.
For some ratings, with higher first- term productivity,
it may be less expensive to recruit new personnel than to
have the first- termers reenlist.
For other ratings, with high first- term training
costs and low productivity, the military should probably be
willing to offer substantial pay hikes or other attractive
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E. COr#IENTS ON SEPARATE RATINGS
1. Introduction
The previous analyses indicate that military income,
work conditions, and expectations about a civilian job vary
significantly among the various ratings. Also the retention
intention rates and reactions to different bonus alternatives
show large variations among ratings. This indicates that each
rating should be treated separately in order to establish
efficient and effective retention controlling measures. One
way to find the impact of various factors on retention inten-
tion, is to carry out multiple regression analyses for each
rating separately. Among the factors that probably should
be included, are:
a. Difference between military and expected civilian
pay






g. The attitude towards various job factors, (promo-
tion opportunities, job variation, autonomy, supervisors,
peers, responsibility)
h. Marital status
Regression analyses will, however, require larger
sample sizes than those that are available in tlie present
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survey. The following general comments and suggestions for
some of the larger sized ratings, will therefore be based on
the results from the previous analyses only.
2. Aviation Machinist's Mate (AD). N = 21
The rating has a low retention intention rate (.0 4),
but it seems to be possible to increase it strongly by offer-
ing reenlistment bonus (up to a 63% increase) . This is con-
firmed by the fact that "Low pay and allowances" was this
group's most frequent reason to leave.
This group also seemed to be quite dissatisfied with
their job equipment.
3. Aviation Structural Mechanic (AMS) . N = 21
The retention intention is 14%, and the response to
a $4,000 bonus indicated an increase in retention to more
than double that percentage. Compared with other ratings,
this group has no "extreme" attitudes about civilian job
opportunities or military work conditions.
Their main stated reason for wanting to leave was
"Reduction in military benefits."
4. Aviation Electronics Technician (AT) . N = 44
Their retention intention rate is higher than average
(.2), and an $8,000 bonus seems able to increase it to more
than double. "Low pay and allowances" and "Better civilian
job opportunities" were their main reasons for leaving and
they thought that it would be quite easy to find a good
105

civilian job. They did not expect strong improvements in
civilian job conditions.
5. Boatswain's Mate (BM) . N = 41
Their retention intention rate is below average (.09)
and the analyses indicated that the retention rate may be
quadrupled by establishing an $8,000 reenlistment bonus. In
spite of their low retention intention rate, this group was
among the least optimistic as to the likeliness to find a
good, civilian job, and they are not among those who expected
strong improvements in work conditions in a civilian job.
Their special allowances were small, and they were
therefore among the lowest paid first- termers. A very high
percentage served onboard ships (94%), and they were probably
exposed to more discrimination than most other groups.
An increase in pay, more opportunities to be with
their families, and an effort to improve the discrimination
problem, may boost the retention rate.
6. Boiler Technician (BT) . N = 24
Most of the people in this group (90%) served onboard
ships, and it is therefore no surprise that many said they
would leave because they were separated too much from their
families.
They had high special allowances and earned more than
most first- termers, but they still expected strong improve-
ments in civilian work conditions and pay. However, pay was
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probably not the main problem, which was indicated by the
rather low impact of the bonus offers.
More opportunities to be with their families and better
work schedules may have a great impact on retention (as long
as they keep their high allowances)
.
7. Communication Technicians (CTA, CTO , CTR, CTT) . N = 32
The Communications Technicians in the survey have
higher retention intention rates than any other of the studied
ratings (40%) . This is probably partly due to the fact that
none of them had sea duty. Their expectations about civilian
work conditions and pay were among the very lowest, and except
for the CTT-group, their military pay is also low. However,
the CTT-group seemed to receive higher special allowances
than any other rating, and may be overpaid, considering the
group's expected civilian earnings. Their main complaints were
poor opportunities for advancement and low pay.
Since there was obviously low demand for their special
skills in the civilian community, they seemed to be inclined
to stay and the lowest bonus offer alone will probably increase
retention to a 65%.
8. Electronics Mate (EM) . N = 52
Most of the people in this rating were on sea duty
(90%) . The retention intention rate was far below average
(5%) , and their main reasons for leaving were low pay, civil-
ian opportunities, family separation and personnel policies.
They expected it to be easy to find a good, civilian job.
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In average, they expected a %5,000 annual pay increase
by taking a civilian job, which makes it understandable that
the impact of the bonus offers was not as strong as for other
ratings
.
More opportunities to be with their families, along
with high pay increases, seem necessary if retention intention
shall be improved.
9. Electronics Technicians (ET) . N = 80
69% of the people in this group were on sea duty.
This was higher than average. Family separation was therefore
one of the main reasons for intending to leave.
They expected higher civilian pay than most other
groups, while their military pay was around average. This
made their annual "loss" by staying in the military amount to
almost $7,000. Since they also expected it to be easy to
find a good civilian job, the reenlistment bonus offers have
but little effect on retention intention.
A solution to the family separation problem, along
with major pay increases, seem necessary if the military shall
be able to improve the retention intention rate from the
current 6%.
10. Fire Control Technicians (FTG and FTM) . N = 60
Family separation, good civilian opportunities and
big differences between military and expected civilian pay
were the main reasons stated for wanting to leave the Navy.
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The Missile group (FTM) expected higher civilian pay
than the Gun group (FTG) , but had lower military allowances.
This may be one of the reasons why the FTM group had an even
lower retention rate (6%) than did the FTG group.
On the other side, the Missile group expected it to
be more difficult to find a good civilian job than the Gun
group
.
If pay alone should solve the retention problem, the
pay increase would probably have to be very large, since even
the $8,000 bonus offer had only little effect on stated inten-
tion.
More impact on retention could probably be achieved
by providing the personnel more time with their families,
since 96% of the people in these ratings reported they were
on sea duty.
11. Hospital Corpsmen (HM) . N = 83
This group proves that shore duty does not necessarily
mean high retention intention rates. While 89% reported
serving ashore, only 3% stated they intended to reenlist.
Except for low military pay, it is not possible to
find strong reasons for the low retention intention. They
neither expected strong improvements in civilian work condi-




That pay is the main problem, is confirmed by the
strong effects of the bonus offers (up to 36% increase in
retention intention)
.
12. Hull Maintenance Technicians (HT) . N = 30
These people all served ashore, but the retention
intention rate was still lower than average (10%).
They expected civilian work conditions to be much
better, especially the relations to their supervisors and
peers.
Considering that they all served ashore, it is sur-
prising that 48% express that family separation is a major
reason for leaving.
Their special allowances were higher than for most
ratings, and the bonus alternatives had a rather small effect
on retention intention.
Improvements in work environment and family life were
probably more important than pay for this personnel.
13
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Interior Communications Technicians (IC). N = 23
Also in this rating, almost everybody served onboard
ships (96%)
.
Since their expectations to find a good civilian job
was about average, the demand for this personnel was probably
not especially high. So when they expressed stronger than
most ratings that civilian work conditions would be much
better than current conditions, it may be because their mili-
tary work was harder than for most comparable ratings.
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The work conditions they expected to find better in
a civilian job were among others: Autonomy, Retirement bene-
fits. Challenges, Pay, Promotion and Training opportunities.
The bonus offers had average effect on this personnel.
Less sea duty and improved work conditions may be
more effective than pay hikes on the retention intention,
which was only 3%.
14. Machinist's Mate (MM). N = 86
Also in this group, everybody (97%) had sea duty and
there was a low retention rate (3%).
They earned more money than most first- termers , but
they still thought that their pay could be increased by around
50% if they took a civilian job.
Except for family separation, pay, lack of challenges,
and their work schedule seem to be their main complaints.
Also, more people in this rating than in any other intended
to leave because they did not like their job (19%)
.
Their current pay would probably be satisfactory for
a lot of this personnel if only their work environment and
conditions could be improved. That higher pay was not very
important for people in this category was confirmed by the
very low reactions to the bonus offers.
15. Personnelmen (PN) . N = 28
The personnelmen seemed to be quite satisfied with
their military service. Only 29% served onboard ships.
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relatively few complained about family separation, and their
pay was at an average level.
They found it harder than most groups to find a good
civilian job, and the civilian pay hike would also be low,
compared with other ratings.
As a result, their retention intention rate was rela-
tively high (25%) , and the bonus offers could increase reten-
tion intention rates with around 51%, to a total of around 76%
16. Radiomen (RI4) . N = 86
This rating scored close to average values in most
factors: Percentage on sea duty, military pay and allowances,
difference between military and civilian pay, retention in-
tention rate, and likeliness to find a good job.
The work schedule is the only factor where these
people felt stronger than others that a civilian job would be
much better.
However, they did react strongly to bonus offers,
indicating that better pay was an important factor for this
group.
17. Aviation Storekeepers (SK) . N = 39
Their military pay was low, and so were their expecta-
tions about civilian pay. Also, they found it harder than
most groups to find a good, civilian job.
The reason for the low retention intention rate (10%)
is therefore hard to explain. It is most probably their pay,
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since retention intention rates increased by 3 to 4 times with




V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. THE MOST IMPORTANT RETENTION INTENTION FACTORS
1. Introduction
It is hardly surprising to find that the most important
factors for retention intentions are:
a. military pay and civilian opportunities
b. duty station (sea duty or serving ashore)
c. family considerations
This study also indicates that total military pay,
perceived civilian opportunities, duty station and work
environment vary to a large extent between people in different
ratings.
2. Military Pay and Civilian Opportunities
Those who perceive the biggest monetary "loss" by
staying, are not necessarily those who say they will leave.
It seems that it is more important for pay to be above a
certain minimum level, which makes it possible to cover the
more common needs for one's self and the family. If the mil-
itary income is below that minimum level, people will tend to
leave even when civilian pay increases are expected to be
quite small.
The study also shows that the military probably pay
rent to the lowest educated personnel, while people with a
high school diploma or more education are underpaid.
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In general, there seem to be large differences be-
tween expectations and realism as to the probable, civilian
income level they could attain.
Without data from the survey, this writer suggests
that an elimination of the contract system after the first
four years of service, and establishment of an ordinary work
relationship, may have positive effects on retention both in
the short run and long run. People who now leave because of
unwillingness to start another four year commitment may turn
out to stay even longer. Such a system would save reenlist-
ment bonuses, which could be used to structure the general
pay system in a more competitive way.
3. Duty Station
First- termers who serve onboard ships, have generally
much lower retention intention rates than those who serve
ashore.
The differences in retention intention rates are
smaller for second- termers, and for third- termers the re-
tention intention rates are higher among those at sea.
The main reason for the lower reenlistment intentions
of those at sea seem to be that sea duty results in long
periods away from the families. People on sea duty have also
generally longer work hours, and their opportunities are





To be separated from the family over long time periods
is mainly a problem for personnel onboard ships. However,
large groups of personnel who serve ashore also mention the
same issue. In general, but especially for the latter group,
this social problem can probably be reduced by military
efforts.
The study shows that singles also have a need to be
with their families.
B. THE ECONOMICAL CONSEQUENCES OF RETENTION
Equations have been presented for computation of
a. net savings per retained enlistee, and
b. total savings that result from different bonus alter-
natives
In order to achieve accurate results, it is especially
important that productivity rates, interest rates, recruit-
ment costs, training costs and annual pay be as accurate as
possible. Especially because of differences in productivity
rates, the computations should be done separately for each
rating.
The study indicates that each retained f irst-teinner means
large savings for the military. For many ratings, the cur-
rent retention elasticities are at such a level that the more
money that is spent at retention efforts, the more money





Based on what has been said above, the final recommenda-
tions of this study are as follows:
a. For retention controlling policies to be efficient
and effective, it seems necessary to decide upon such
policies in accordance with separate studies of each
rating.
b. Pay differentiation and different promotion patterns
based on civilian, educational level, military training,
and market wage would improve recruitment and retention
of people with higher education. It would also make it
easier to structure the workforce more in accordance with
military needs, and reduce rent.
c. An effort to inform enlistees about what they realis-
tically can expect to earn in a civilian job, may have a
positive effect on retention.
d. It should be considered to eliminate the contract sys-
tem after the first four years of service, and to use the
saved bonus money to structure the pay system more compe-
tively.
e. A great effort seems necessary to improve service
patterns and/or family accommodations so that the first-
termers, both married and singles, can have more time
with their families.
f. The use of more older enlistees at sea duty, and more
first- termers ashore should be considered.
g. In order to determine the economical consequences of
retaining personnel from different ratings, and thereby
to determine how much effort to put forth in trying to
retain those personnel, the following variables should
be taken into account, as prescribed earlier in this
study:
- the present value of recruitment costs, training
costs, wages, retirement benefits, and bonus
offers (reenlistment incentives)
- the probability that the person eventually will
retire
- productivity rates
- reactions to different bonus alternatives, pay
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